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THE DYNAMICS OF LEARNING IN MIS-SPECIFIED MODELS.
April 1991
Vincent Brousseau and Alan Rinnan' 
E.U.I. Florence.
Abstract
In this paper we study an example in which agents misspecify the game that 
they are playing. We show that there is a class of self-sustaining equilibria which are 
perfectly consistent with the agents’ beliefs and which are achieved by O.L.S. 
learning in a trivial way. We show that only the equilibria found in an earlier paper 
by one of us can be sustained by O.L.S. learning. Lastly, we show that if we make a 
continuous time approximation, then all these equilibria are unstable.
1 I would like to thank participants in the the CORE mathematical economics seminar, in the Indian 
Statistical Institute conference on “Game theory and economic applications”, and the University of 





















































































































































































THE DYNAMICS OF LEARNING IN MIS-SPECIFIED
MODELS.
April 1991
Vincent Brousseau and Alan K irm an1 
E.II.I. Florence.
In tr o d u c t io n .2
It is a truism that agents can never fully specify the 
environment in which they operate. They must then function with 
limited and misspecified models. With some such model in mind 
they may try to learn from their experience about its precise 
specification. Learning, of course, only makes sense in a dynamic 
setting, and in a dynamic model two important complications can 
arise. Firstly the outcomes which agents observe, and from which 
they learn, are influenced by their actions. Secondly, these actions 
themselves may be influenced by the learning process. Thus two 
types of feed-back may interfere with the inferences that agents 
make about the world in which they operate. The argument made in 
previous papers by one of us, (Kirman (1975, 1983)) was, in some 
ways, analogous to that made in the "sun-spots" literature. There, 
by conditioning on some "irrelevant" events, agents come to
believe, and, indeed, their beliefs are confirmed by their 
observations, that the evolution of the economy is affected by 
those events, (see e.g. Azariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983), 
Grandmont (1989) and Guesnerie (1986)). In Kirman (1975, 1983), 
agents specify a model which also does not correspond to the "true" 
one, but, in the long run, their forecasts are verified by their
observations. Thus they have no reason to change their vision of the
world. The very process of learning leads to self-fulfilling
expectations. The main result was that, in the context of the 
simple model considered, there is a whole class of final 
"equilibria" which can be attained in this way, but which have no 
relationship, in general, to the "true" equilibria, though including 
the latter, as special cases.
Two questions remained open, however. Firstly the 
agents, who were using least squares to estimate the parameters
1 I would like to thank participants in the the CORE mathematical economics seminar, 
in the Indian Statistical Institute conference on “Game theory and economic 
applications", and the University of Venice seminar, for helpful comments.
2 This paper pursues the analysis started elsewhere (see Arrow and Green (1974), 




























































































of their mistaken model, might have been puzzled by the behaviour 
of the residuals. Since the errors were generated by an omitted 
variable, these do not correspond to the white noise usually 
specified when using least squares estimation. In particular in the 
examples constructed all errors after the initial three periods 
were zero. This could be solved by adding white noise to the "true" 
model and after several periods the residuals behaved exactly as 
they were expected to do. In fact, incompatibility between 
observed behaviour and the model specified is common to many 
models with learning, (see Bray (1983) for example). Indeed it is 
now frequently argued that least squares learning, for example, is 
simply a "reasonable” learning procedure and no reference is made 
to the statistical properties of the estimators nor to the
assumptions about the structure of the errors. However, one might 
ask, within the context of the particular model under
consideration, if there are not final states, which could be attained 
without the agents making any error whatsoever. In the first part
of this paper we give a positive answer to this question for a 
simple mis-specified duopoly model.
A second problem is that it was not proved in Kirman 
(1983) that there was convergence to a "rational expectations" sit­
uation from any initial conditions. However repeated simulations 
seemed to show that such convergence did, in fact, occur. In the
second part of this paper we show that this is not the case and
prove that, in general, the learning process does not converge. The 
apparent convergence is due to the fact that, as the memory of 
those learning increases, the evolution of the process is slowed
down since each successive observation gets less and less weight.
Thus, although the trajectory is not convergent, progress along it
becomes steadily slower. We then give an example of what happens 
if memory is restricted to a finite number of observations. In 
particular it is then shown that, in this case, the behaviour of the 
process is qualitatively different from the infinite case since 
cycles can occur whilst in the latter this is impossible. Thus the 
work in this paper is clearly related to recent work by Nyarko 
(1990).
The lack of convergence, in both the finite and 
infinite case, casts doubt on earlier assertions of Sargent (1987) 
that, as a matter of practical concern, econometricians can afford 
to ignore the learning process that precedes the establishment of a 
rational expectations equilibrium. The very fact that agents are 
trying to learn about what they believe to be a stationary 
environment may generate highly non-stationary and non- 




























































































those of Bray (1981), Bray and Savin (1986), Fourgeaud, 
Gourieuroux, and Pradel (1986) and more recently, Marcet and 
Sargent (1989) all of whom show how simple learning will lead to 
a rational expectations equilibrium. Woodford (1990), on the other 
hand, shows that learning may lead to an equilibrium where 
originally erroneous beliefs become self-fulfilling. Our results are 
even less comforting however, for in our simple model, agents 
will, in general, never learn to believe in anything.
A sim p le  m odel
We consider a symmetric duopoly in which the demand func­
tions for firms 1 and 2 are given by the "true model":
d&pitXpJjt)] = a  - 13 p i t )  + y p 2(t) 
d2[ptk ),p2(f)] = a -  P p 2U) + y p it )
( 1 )
(2)
We also assume, in the tradition of Cournot, that production is 
costless, and hence the goal for each of the two firms if they knew 
the true model would be to maximize revenue given the price of the 
opponent.
We suppose, as in Kirman (1983), that the two firms, through 
ignorance or inertia, are unaware that their demand depends on 
each other's actions. In a duopoly situation, such an assumption is 
difficult to accept, but it is more plausible in a several firm 
situation in which each firm feels unable to take explicit account 
of the behaviour of all the opponents and hence focuses on the 
"own-price" demand curve or on a demand curve involving only some 
of the prices of its opponents and adds a random term to take 
account of the, to him, unpredictable behaviour of the other firms. 
Indeed, it changes nothing in our results to consider an n-firm 
model, as do Gates and associates (1977, 1978).
The two firms will thus have the following "perceived model":
d \p l{t)] = a l - b lp i t )  + t ; j )  (3)
d7[p i t) \  = a 1 - b 2p i t )  + z i t )  (4)
Each of the firms might for example assume, at least initially, in 
the standard econometric tradition, that the error terms are 




























































































e,(r) -  Af(0,a,2)
If the firms have no information about their respective parameters 
a/ and how should or would they set about trying to establish 
their true values? Kirman (1975) showed that if both firms knew, 
or rather believed with certainty, that b, = than a reasonable 
Bayesian learning process would lead them, despite their 
misspecification of the model, to the Cournot equilibrium of the 
"true" game.
However, as in Kirman (1983), we are concerned here with 
the case in which the firms have no information about the values of 
the parameters and try to learn from experience about them. How 
will the model then evolve? At each period, given the quantities 
observed at each price, the firms will make their estimates of the 
two parameters of their perceived demand curves, and we shall
call these estimates a,(t) and b,(t). If we assume that each firm 
simply wishes to maximize expected profit in the next period3, 




So, at each period, given its estimates, each firm will charge a 
price, and the demand realized as a result of these prices will, of 
course, be given by the true model specified by equations (1) and 
(2). This new observation of a price-quantity pair will lead to a 
revision of the estimates of the parameters and, in turn, to new 
prices and so forth.
As mentioned, a reasonable learning process would make the 
sequence of prices converge to
. . a
3 If firms wish to maximise the discounted sum of all future profits then an 
interesting problem arises. Will it not be worth charging widely dispersed prices at 
the outset to gain more information at the cost of a loss of short run profit? This 
problem is discussed in Balvers and Cosimano (1990) and Easley and Kiefer (1988) 





























































































the Cournot solution, if for some reason the firms were to set 
b,(t] = (3 for all t.
A sensible procedure for the case where there is ignorance of 
both the parameters is for each firm to try to fit the observed data 
by means of least squares4. The model we consider is a special 
case of that developed by Gates, Rickard and Wilson (1977),5 in 
which they allow for n firms and variable weights for preceding 
observations. They were obliged, however, to confine their 
attention to particular cases to obtain analytic results.
In our particular model, we can specify the ordinary least 
square estimates for a, and b, as follows:
, y ^ ,i<(*)-4(cilp,(*;-#(*)]
x : > , «>-«■>!■ (6)
and
= + (| = 1,2)
where
pm )t - 1 and
Y Z pM
t -1
It is helpful to observe that (6) can be rewritten for firm 1, 
for example, as
b,it) = P flWllPtW-Pit)  1
(8)
and symmetrically for firm 2.
We see clearly then precisely where the "misbehaviour" in 
the system comes from. The second term in (8) is the covariance 
of the prices or the bias due to the omission of a variable which is 
correlated with one of the included variables and, as a result, is
4This behaviour on the part of firms can be justified from a Bayesian point of view; 
see, for example, Zellner (1971). A consideration of general forms of updating and 
learning that include this type of process can be found in Aoki (1976).




























































































familiar to econometricians. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that 
the prices are related that generates problems in the evolution of 
the system.
That the whole system is recursive is evident, because at 




Hence, from the equation for the true demand (1), we have for firm 
1, for example,
(t) = [a + Yp2( t ) ^ ,11bi[*)-,Pi(f)f ~vPiW jj 'J& W ~P W IpW ~ P £ t)] 
and symmetrically for firm 2.6
This recurrence relation is a special case of that given by 
G.R.W. (1977). It is apparent that even in this form it is not a triv­
ial matter to establish whether convergence does or does not 
occur.
S e lf -s u s ta in in g  E q u ilib r ia
We first observe that there are situations in which if the 
estimates aj and b; of the two players for their parameters take on 
particular values they will never move again.
Define self-sustaining equilibrium parameter values for 
given Pi and P2 as
6 Thus, the underlying data-generating process is a nonlinear dynamic model. The 
evolution of the estimators and in consequence the prices can also be seen by 
considering updating formulas and we will come back to this in studying the general 

































































































ai = 2(a -Ppi + yp’2)
ai =2(a -  Pp' + yp')
Clearly if  at some t it is the case that 
a^t) =aiand b, (t) = b‘
then Pi(t) = p* for i=l, 2 and all t> t.
Now we ask: for which of these equilibria can we find initial 
conditions such that the least squares learning procedure will 
subsequently converge to values of the parameters, in the set 
defined above?
This question was answered in Kirman (1983) as follows. 
T h eorem
If for p, and p2*̂  the parameters a^a^b, and b’2 defined in (1) 
and (2) satisfy
y 2 > (P -b i)(p -b*2)> 0
then there exist p,(l),p,(2),p1(3) and p2(l),p2(2),p2(3) such that a(4) = a”
b,(4) = bi a2(4) = ajand b,(4) = b'2
Hence P,(t) = pi and p2(t) = p', for all t > 4.
Thus there is a whole set of self-sustained equilibria which 
can be attained through least square learning and there is clearly 
dependence on initial conditions.
An objection to this result is that the alert observer would 
be surprised by the sudden disappearance of the error terms: This




























































































indeed so ordering them that the errors diminish over time. If the 
actor then employed generalised least squares with a decreasing 
variance for the error term they would then be less surprised if not 
fully convinced, since after some finite time the errors would still 
disappear. All this, of course, presupposes that the agent made 
specific assumptions about the nature of the stochastic error 
process. This is not necessary. A second observation is that it is 
easily shown that adding extra initial conditions does not enlarge 
the set of equilibria that can be attained.
A simpler question then is, can we find initial conditions 
leading to self-sustained equilibria which can be directly arrived 
at with no error? This would be the case if all observations of 
price and demand lay on a linear demand curve a, - bjP and where the
aichoice of the optimal price Pi ~ ~  gave rise to demands lying on 
the same curve.
The answer is that this is indeed the case, and to give a clear 
statement of the result let us introduce the following notation.
i) Denote by D, (resp. D2) the domain of the price demand couples 
Pi, di (resp. P2, di) of the first (resp. second) firm, i.e. D, = D2=R,,xR.
ii) Denote by P the domain of the strictly positive price pairs
(PpP2)
i.e. p = r ;,.
iii) Denote by N, (resp. N, resp. M) the current observation in D, 
(resp. D, resp. P). Thus we shall refer to N,(t) for example.
iv) It will be useful to identify three lines and two particular 
points in P.
Denote by p ‘ the line
a + yy = Px in P
and by p" the line
a + yx = py in P




























































































and by M the point
f_J!___ O
vP - y ’ P - y )
Clearly M is the intersection of the three lines p ' , p" and p"'
and finally by G the point
( a a
U ( P - y ) ’ 2 ( P - y),
Now for any line p in P if all the observations M(l), M(2).... 
M(T-l) are on p then the observations N^t) for t=l, ... T-l lie on a 
line in Dl Thus the firm perceives a demand curve of the form
di = a ,-b iPi
Clearly we must confine our attention to the case where the 
parameters and b( are strictly positive.
In this case the profit functions are concave and have a 
a.unique maximum at the price ^  .
The point M(T) will then be the point
The question is will, or can, this point lie on the line p? The 
answer is given by the following
Theorem  1
Assume P*Y then for any point p in P-(P'Up") there is at 
least one line A(pl with positive slope 0 ^ ° ” such that the point
f a l. a2 )




























































































The calculation of A (p) and the proof are given in the 
mathematical appendix with the proof of the other theorems.
The next question is which price pairs can be attained as the 
limit of a sequence of aligned prices? Such an equilibrium can be 
called a perfectly self-sustaining equilibrium.
The answer is given by 
Theorem  2
Assume P * Y then the set E of points 2b,J where ai,a2,b1,b2
are strictly positive, which are perfect self-sustaining equilibria 
is a continuum of dimension 1 in P and satisfies the equation
2P(y(x2+y2)-2pxy)-ot(y -2g)(x + y )-q 2= 0
Given the constraints, the relevant part of this hyperbole is 
that between the lines p' and p" defined previously and which cuts 
p '“ , the diagonal, at the point G.
Thus the joint monopoly or cooperative solution can be 
attained in this way whilst the Cournot solution cannot.
It is easy to check that if both firms charge the same prices 
i.e. if for all t
P.(t) = P2(t)
then for 1 -  3
P,(t) = P2(t) = a
2(P-Y)
i.e. the cooperative solution. Thus unconscious imitation will lead 
to cooperation.
Least squares learning: Dynam ics
Till now we have considered special sequences of prices 
which would lead directly, i.e. after two or three observations, to 
self-sustaining equilibria. The question now is would be general 




























































































conditions? It was conjectured in Kirman (1983) that this would 
be the case for two reasons. Firstly, the set of attainable 
equilibria was independent of the number of initial observations 
and secondly numerous simulations showed apparent convergence. 
In the ''non-aligned" case what characterises convergence is that 
the empirical variance-covariance matrix converges. In the case 
described in Theorem 1 this matrix only changes in modulus. Thus, 
the process can be thought of as having a fixed direction. What we 
can show, however, is that the only two cases in which the process 
converges are those which correspond to those obtained starting 
from the initial conditions of the "aligned" type or from those 
constructed in Theorem 1. Thus somewhat informally we have
Theorem 3
If the least squares learning procedure converses to 
stationary values of Pi and Pc then these must be attained from the 
initial conditions constructed in Theorems 1 and 2.
Before proceeding to the 
introduce some useful notation.
4 0
i '.-i
m-t l > «1 f=l
4 0
I'.'1
= j l  P 4f)l ,= i
«to
1 ''-1 . 
“7 2>>(*>l  t=i
4 0 :
1
= ; X Pi(t)p2(t)
M O
1 '•"1
= 1 ^ )t r=i
u ( 0
2= u -  X
v(0 II < 1 X
W {tc) = w - y 2





































































































, i a(u  -  x 2) + y (yu -xv) _ l gU + y (yu  -  XV)
P^° ~ 2 & { u - x 2) - y ( v - x y )  ~ 2 f iU - y V
, . 1 g (w -x y )  + y(xw -yv) 1 a.W + y (x W -y V )  (2 0 )
P^ ° ’ ~ 2  P l w - y ^ - y f v - ^  ~2  PIT->V
We add two further definitions:
8 ,{t') = P M - x
1 (a  - 2px)(i/ - x 2) + y (y u + x v  + 2x2y)
2 P ( « - x 2) - y ( v - x y )
1 (a  + y y - 2P*)t/ + yxV
2 0l / - y V
( 21)
giM = p * t ,) -y = 2
1 (a  -20y)(w -  y 2) + y (yv+ xw+ 2xy2)
P ( w - y 2) - y ( v - ^ y )
1 ( a  + yx ^ 2Py)W/ + yyV
2 PW -  yV
(22)
The two possible types of equilibrium
It is clearly sufficient to study the five variables x, y, U, V 
and W to determine the dynamics of the system. The five vector (x, 
y, U, V, W) at time t depends only on its values at time t-1. In fact 
we have
X X 8 i
y y
(0 + y -
Si
V (t + i) = V g l - u
t +1
V V Sl«2_V
_w. _WA - 8 2 - W _
(0 (23)
Note that two types of equilibria are possible, either those in 
which the five vector is unchanged or. alternatively, those which 




























































































prices do not change but the associated statistics continue to do 
so.
Recalling the previous notation M = {pl,pJ,  we will write
M = (x,y) where x,y are as defined in (11) and (12), i.e. the vector of 
average points at a given time.
Denote by T the empirical variance-covariance matrix of the 
M(t), i.e.
U V  
V W (24)
If T is non-null, we can think of 3 the set of scalar multiples 
of T as the "direction" of T. Thus we can write
f=(X ,3)
We observe that the functions P = [Pi('\p^-)) and G = (gf ), g,( )) are 
homogeneous of degree 0 in T and can thus be written
P = P(M, 3) and G = G(M, 3)
Now, it is easily shown that
G(M,3)=0 (25)
defines 3 as an implicit function of M and hence we can write
(26)
Thus for any fixed M there is a unique associated direction. With 
this in mind we can now proceed to the
Proof of Theorem 3
Note that the system of equations (23) defines the way in 



























































































(27)7(t+l)-7(t) = —  Gt Gt +1
where Gr is the transpose of G. 3 will be unchanged in only two
cases:
(i) if G is null or
(ii) if Gt G is in 3.
We now examine each of the cases in turn.
Equilibria corresponding to (i)
Solving the equation G=0 gives the following
(a +Yy-2Px)£/+yxV=0 (28)
(a + y x -  2|3 y)W + y yV = 0 (29)
These are precisely the conditions given in Kirman [1983], thus in 
this case the variance-covariance matrix does not degenerate. It 
is also interesting to note that any initial conditions M(t) which 
result in a variance covariance matrix satisfying (28) and (29) 
would result in such an equilibrium and these might be quite 
different from those constructed by Kirman [1983]. However, it 
should also be noted that increasing the number of initial 
conditions does not enlarge the size of the equilibrium since all 
the equilibria satisfying (28) and (29) can be generated from three 
initial conditions.
Equilibria corresponding to (lit
In this case G is non-null and Gr G defines the limit value of 
the direction 3. Since GT G is of rank one, it is clear that the 
equilibria in question are those associated with a sequence of 
points on a line in Dx.
To see this, replace U, V, W by gt Sign g? respectively and one 




























































































, (a + y y - 2&x)gl + yxg2
2(Ps,-YS2) (30)
, (a +yx-2Py)g2+ Yyg,
(31)2(P g2~Y g)
where X is a real number. X =0 corresponds to the previous case.
It is easy to see that the equations can be solved simultaneously if 
and only if the determinant of the following matrix is zero
2g,(Pgr  yy2) (a + yy - 2 ( i x ) g l + y xg2
2g2(P g2 “ Y 3i) (oc + y x -2py)g2 + y yg, (32)
Writing out the determinant gives
P Y yg\ + (Pa -  P yx -  2p V + Y a)g]gi 
+(PYy-Ya-pa + 2p2x)g^2 + (-pya)g2
But this is, of course, the polynomial identified previously, and 
this completes the proof of Theorem 3.
It is important to emphasise a difference between the two 
cases. In the case of aligned equilibrium the variance covariance 
is degenerate whereas in the other case it is of rank 2 but only 
varies by a constant multiple. This reflects the fact that in one 
case the prices and statistics do not change whilst in the other, 
although the prices are fixed, the statistics still evolve.
Behaviour of the system out of equilibrium
The apparent convergence of the model in general is due 
simply to the fact that although prices do not converge in general 
the speed along the trajectory in P slows down progressively as 
the length of the memory increases. Thus each additional 
observation changes the estimates, and hence the prices, very 




























































































general and this can be observed by giving geometrically declining 
weights to previous observations or by truncating the memory.
Given this, though, we can still ask the following question: if 
we perturb the initial conditions leading to a self-sustained 
equilibrium slightly, does the learning process still converge to 
that equilibrium?
The answer unfortunately is no and we have 
Theorem  4
Self-sustained equilibrium prices are unstable
Before proceeding to the proof some observations are in 
order. Theorem 3 showed that only the “aligned” equilibrium just 
defined or those defined in Kirman (1983), referred to from now on 
as "dispersed” equilibria, can be attained. If we now use a 
continuous time approximation we can study the stability of these 
equilibria and show that the direction of the trajectory at any of 
the “dispersed equilibria” must be a straight line through that 
point. This means that in the continuous time approximation the 
“dispersed” equilibria cannot be attained at all, since the learning 
process which leads to one of these equilibria must “carry” it 
through that point. The “aligned” equilibria are clearly unstable, 
since it is always possible to perturb the initial conditions a little 
so as to attain a new equilibrium point on the hyperbole defined 
previously.
We have already mentioned the problem that the system 
slows down over time because of the diminishing effect of each 
subsequent observation. This can clearly be seen from the 
1
presence of the factor f+ [ in equations (27).
Suppose now that we consider t large and try to calculate the 
solutions to the system (19)-(20) replacing t by log t. This 
amounts to giving less weight to earlier observations.
Solving this problem by numerical integration is equivalent 




























































































We will study the behaviour of this system in order to establish 
the
Proof of Theorem 4.
Using then (33) as an approximate model for the behaviour of the 
system (23), we can write
where s is a real valued function and Z for a given M is a vector 
field on the manifold of directional matrices. This field has a 
unique zero root at
3  = / / ( « )
Consider the first type of equilibrium in which G=0. In this 
case M and 3 must remain constant over time. This is possible if 
and only if 3 = H(M). Since the coordinate A decreases over time, 
we have only a partial solution to the dynamic system.
Suppose now that we define the elements of 3 as T/trace T. 
The parameter A is therefore simply given by
A = trace T
The system of differential equations can now be written
d TA G
































































































' u " G
9 - G'G - 3G2
S G2-*  > (35)
where we recall that G maps M and 3  into St2. GrG is a 2x2 matrix 
and G2 a scalar.
For a given Mo consider 30 = //(Mo). Clearly G(Mo3o) = 0 and 
[Mo.Sk) is a solution of our problem.






where M is a real number and a an angle. We can also rewrite G in 
a neighbourhood of G0 = 0 as
G =
g cos 6 ) 
8 sin 6 J (37)
where g is a real number and 0 an angle.
In fact the manifold formed by the 3  has at 30 a tangent 
Euclidean space TS for which the 2 matrices
1 O') (0 1
0 -lj and [ l  0
form a base.
G is then differentiable in 3 and is equal to 0 at 30 . Thus G 
is first order linear in 3 -  3),. This can be written
G= L x .=3“ $0)+ ~*̂ o) (38)
where I  is a linear mapping from the tangent space TS into the 
space of the G. L has rank 2, Si depends on U/V and 82 on W/V and 
these coordinates are independent. From (38) we see that for r 




























































































(+1, or -1). Now if there is a linear bijection from one space of 
dimension 2 to another, then when point G makes a 360o turn in the 
first space its image does the same.
Turning back now to L. Consider a basis of 30 where 
a° = (o Considers as starting from the first eigen
vector of this basis. We have then
GrG -3G2 g2 ( cos 20 +1 -  2X sin 20 Ì 
2X [sin 20 -1 + 2X - cos20 J
2X ((l-2X) + cos20)
'1 o ' / o  lYI+ sin 20 i
0  - 1 . V  oJJ
Since we are dealing with an equilibrium of the first type, -30 is 
non singular, hence Xe ]0, 1( and ;i-2X )e ] — 1, 1( .
Thus
GtG -3G 2
X makes two full turns around zero.
and il sISo
have the same argument. They are thus parallel and in the same 
direction. In figure 1 we see what happens in a neighbourhood of
3b.





























































































Thus there is always a direction leading away from S0 which 
stabilises as r tends to 0. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
An Example
A natural reaction to eliminate the slowing down of the pro­
cess is to truncate the memory. However, this completely changes 
the dynamics, in the discrete case.
We simulated an example in which the parameters took the 




























































































P,(l)=l P2(l) = 2 
P,(2) = 3 P2(2) = 4 
P,(3)=5 P2(3) = 6
After the fifth period we restricted the memory to five periods and 
the process was captured by the following limit cycle which 
remained unchanged over 70,000 periods.
(P,P2) -  (1.8388, 2.0160) (1.8389, 2.0162) (1.8438, 2.0178) 
(1.8752, 2.0069) (2.0122, 1.8724) (1.9949, 0.8652) (1.8388,
2.0160)
Thus there is a cycle of period 7 which cannot be detected by the 
actors.
C o n c lu s io n s
Although cases may be constructed leading to a large class of 
self-sustained equilibria in our simple model, least squares 
learning is not stable. Though agents' ideas of the parameters will 
change more and more slowly as time goes on, they are not 
converging to any equilibria. The dynamics of this become very 
clear when agents' memories are limited. The source of the 
problem here is the omission of important variables, other players' 
strategies rather than the inclusion of initially irrelevant 
variables, as in the case of sunspots.
Thus our simple example illustrates not merely the problem 
of misspecification, but is particularly relevant to games in which 
players are ignorant of the identity of, or the strategies played by 
their opponents. An important question remains. To what extent 
would players be able to infer from their observations that they 
are dealing with strategic behaviour, and if they were able to do 
so, would the learning process converge? The answer is far from 
clear, since our example shows that agents may be misled into 
believing that they are converging to an understanding of the true 
model if they use all the observations that they have made. 
However, if they have a shorter memory, they may not be able to 
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A p p en d ix
Proof of Theorem 1 
Recall that
di(Pi, P2) = a-ppi+YP2 
d2<Pi, P2) = a-Pp2+YPi
Consider a point p in P and consider a line A in P through p with 
parameter X, i.e. any point Pi P2 on this line may be written
A 1 pi = Di 1 X+Dn
A2 P2 — EX 1 X+D22
Assume that the prices set by firms before to are given by a 
sequence of to -1 points (Pi(t), P2(t)) all lying on A. Denote by X(t) the 
parameter corresponding to p(t). Since peA,
A3 pi = DnXp+Di2
A4 P2 = EX 1 Xp+IXi2
The demands at each time t can be written
A5 d[ (pi(t),p2(t))= a-Ppi(t) + YfeiXW+Dd)
A6 d2(pi(t),p2(t))=a-Pp2(t) +y(D11X(t)+D1̂ )
The expressions for X(t) are given by 
A7 Di\ (Pi (t)-Di 2) = X(t)
A8 a 1,(p2(t)-D22) = X(t)
Using these in A5 and A6 we obtain




























































































A 10 d2 (pi i,p2)= X+(yDi} D2!r p)p2-yDi j i)[i IX 2 f yD 2
Regrouping terms we obtain expressions for the parameters a, and bi 
of the observed demand functions d;
A ll  d!=ai-bipi = oc+yD^fDi 1D22-D21D12) + (yt>lDj'^pjpi
A 12 d2=a2-b2P2 = a +yD2'1(D12D21-D11P22)+ (yDi iB>\-p)p2
Since at the point to we have as the optimal choice
we can write 
A13 =
2 PDn-yDn
A14 p2(t0)= L ? -^ 1̂ DllI^ rEblPl") 
PD21-YD11
and since this must lie on A we have also 
A15 p,(to)=DiiX(g+D,2 
A16 P2(to) = P2lX(to)+fX22
Using A1 and A2 to eliminate Dj2 and D22 we obtain
QDi i+^Di i(p2~Q;iXp)-I>i(pi-Di iXp)) + ^
^Dn-yDiji)
1 iXp-pi = Di iX
A18 al>- l ^ Dl t(P2-r>. lAp^Pz .(p̂ DiiAp)) + =D>iX
^ E b .- y D ,, )
This can be solved for X if the following condition is satisfied
aDii+YiDiipj-Dijpi)
Pi Dj































































































Tedious calculations lead to the following third degree polynomial
A20 [piPyj D?j+[aP+ayp2P V-2pij D11D21 + r ayt-piPyaP+2p2p "lE)J1I>! 1-[p2y f j l ^ 1 =0
Since a, P, y, Pi,Pc are all positions by assumption, A20 has at least 
one real root.
The sum of the coefficients of A20 is given by
A21 (p, p + (a p+a YP2P y-2p! p") + (-a y-pi p y-a P+2P2P") - (piY 0) = P(Y-P)(PrP2)
Hence for every value (pi,p2,oc,P, 4 in R++, A20 has a positive root.
Call this root P.
Given that p*i , and that p ip ' and pep", we now show that the 
expressions A13 and A14 cannot have a zero denominator when 
I>i/Dn=p Thus, choosing P as the slope of the line A(p) in Theorem 
1, this will conclude the proof
Suppose the contrary, then P-YP=0. From the development of 
the determinant A19 and the expression A20 it is clear that, if 
p-YP=0, then
A22 (a+Y(P2-PiP))(pp-^P = 0
We have seen that P*0. Furthermore p-Yp=0 and pp-y=0 is impossible, 
since P ” Y . Hence
A23 a+Y(p2-pip) = 0
But since P = P / Y we have
A24 a+yp2-Ppi = 0
the equation of the line p ' , which was excluded a priori. Thus P / Y
cannot be a root of A20 and by the same argument neither can ŶP 





























































































It is easy but tedious to show that for any p on A(p) p(p)=p.
Proof of Theorem 2
We have to show which values of (Pi,Pa) can be attained as the 
limit of a sequence of “aligned points” (pi(t),P2(t)). Thus a point p is 
the limit of such a sequence if it is the “critical” point of the line
A(p). In other words given a sequence of points p(t) t=l, ... t,, on A(p), 
p is a limit of points if and only if the sequence of optimal points
p(t) is such that p(t) = p for all t>to.











Eliminating P we obtain
A29 (2Ppr a-YP2)(2Pp2-a-ypi) = r  P1P2
Using the fact that P > Y , we observe that this gives a hyperbola 
with asymptotic slopes




























































































There are two branches to the hyperbola but clearly only that
a a
which cuts the diagonal at 2(p _ y) ’ 2(p -  y ) can attained.
It should be noted that this branch of the hyperbola can only 
be attained by one of the lines through a given point p with the 
exception of the point G which has the three lines with respective 
slopes P = Y / P and P = P / Y lead to it.
This is easily seen, since we have b;>0 and since
A31 P - Y A i ^ n
A32 P-Y Dud ;\
and
A33 p = EbjD'n 
then we have
Y P- < p  < —
A34 P V
Thus the set of limit points attainable from “aligned” initial 
conditions is defined by the branch of A29 passing through
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